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Size, age, sector, and productivity are commonly cited as 
factors determining a firm’s survival. However, there are 
several dimensions of the investment climate in which 
the firm operates that affect whether it continues in 
business or exits. This paper uses new panel data from 
27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries to 
test the importance of five areas of the business climate 
on firm exit: the efficiency of government services, 
access to finance, the extent of corruption or cronyism, 
the strength of property rights, and the degree of 
competition. The paper finds that weaknesses in these 
areas do affect the probability of firm exit—largely 
in ways that undermine the Schumpeterian cleansing 
role of exit in raising overall productivity. Greater costs 
and regulatory burdens raise the probability that more 
productive firms exit, while less developed financial 
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in the department to explore firm dynamics and the microeconomics of growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mhallward@worldbank.org.  
and legal institutions mitigate forces that would 
otherwise push less productive firms to exit. Thus, the 
more productive firms stand to gain the most from 
improvements in the investment climate, whether 
that is lowering transaction costs or improving market 
mechanisms. This holds both within countries and 
across countries. The impact of a particular investment 
climate measure can also differ significantly by type of 
firm, with the focus given to firm size. The differential 
impact on size can be significant at a size cutoff of 10 
or more employees. As these are the firms that are near 
the threshold of many regulatory requirements, the 
implications are not just with regard to whether a firm 
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Firms do not all face the same probability of exiting.  Several studies have used plant 
level data to show how size, age, sector and productivity can help predict a plant’s survival 
(Bernard and Jensen (2002); Bernard and Sjoholm(2003); Frazer (2005); Harding et al. 
(2004)).  But these studies do not address the role of the broader business environment in 
which a plant operates and how it can interact with firm heterogeneity in explaining exit 
patterns.  Using a new panel dataset of 4,800 firms with detailed measures of the business 
environment collected in a comparable way across 27 countries demonstrates the significance 
of including investment climate factors in explaining which firms exit.   The results show that 
these factors not only affect the rate of exit, but also the composition of firms that exit.   
The paper examines five areas of the investment climate:  the efficiency of 
government services, access to finance, the extent of corruption or cronyism, the strength of 
property rights and the degree of competition.  Many of these dimensions have been found to 
be important in explaining firm entry, investment and growth. (Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2004); Aterido et al. (2009); Beck et al. (2005); Dollar et al. (2005); Johnson et al. (2002); 
Klapper et al. (2004).  This is the first paper to test for their importance in understanding firm 
exit rates. 
The measures of the investment climate fall into two broad groups, those that affect 
transactions costs of doing business and those that affect the market disciplining mechanisms.  
Delays and red tape are examples of the former.  Greater rule of law, more developed 
institutions – including financial institutions—and greater competition are examples of the 
latter.  The paper looks both at their effects on overall rates of exit as well as their effects on 
the composition of firms that survive.   3
The paper finds that increasing transaction costs are associated with higher rates of 
exit, while weaker market enabling environments tend to lower exit rates.  However, in both 
cases, weaknesses in the investment climate contribute to unfavorable composition effects.   
In locations with higher bribes, higher crime and greater delays in government services, exit 
rates are higher – and productive firms are more likely to exit.  On the other hand, where 
legal rights are weak, financial services are less developed and competition is muted, exit 
rates are lower, with less efficient firms less likely to exit.  These effects are found both 
across locations within a country, as well as across countries grouped according to their level 
of financial or legal development.  Improving the investment climate may or may not lower 
exit rates, but it should improve the composition of surviving firms, contributing to a more 
efficient allocation of resources and raising overall productivity. 
The paper also investigates whether there are differences across types of firms in the 
impact of the investment climate on survival, even controlling for productivity.  Of particular 
interest is firm size.   It is not the case that the smallest firms (less than 10 employees) are 
always hit the hardest by a weak investment climate.  The smallest firms are 
disproportionately affected by access to finance, but they are less likely to be affected by 
regulatory costs, in part because they are often exempt from these requirements.  Those in the 
10-50 employee range are often worse off than the smallest firms and are particularly affected 
by competitive pressures and bribes.  Weak property rights have a greater impact on larger 
firms (50 plus workers).  Thus this paper argues for the importance of combining firm 
heterogeneity with disaggregated measures of the business environment to better understand 
the factors underlying firm exit rates.   4
The contribution of this paper is fourfold.  First, it analyses the impact of the 
investment climate on a new dimension, namely firm survival.  It shows the findings on 
raising transactions costs and weakening market mechanisms are robust to many alternative 
measures available.  Second, it controls for multiple dimensions of the investment climate 
simultaneously.  Thus omitted variable bias is less likely to be a concern than if only a single 
dimension is included.  Third, it uses comparable firm-level data across 27 countries, 
allowing for within-country and cross-country variation to be analyzed.  Fourth, the 
disaggregated data make it possible to test for non-linear impacts across important firm 
characteristics, namely size, age and ownership.  Overall, the paper provides evidence that 
the more productive firms stand to gain the most from improvements in the investment 
climate, whether that is lowering transaction costs or improving market mechanisms. 
The next section provides an overview of the literature.  Section 3 describes the data 




  Dunne et al.’s (1988) finding that 8-10% of manufacturing firms in the US exited 
each year, with rates higher for small and younger firms, sparked a large interest in 
understanding firm exit patterns (Davis et al. (1996), Caves (1998)).  Many were surprised at 
the magnitude of firm closings.  In part this had been masked by their additional finding that 
entry and exit rates were correlated so that net turnover is generally reasonably low.  Similar 
rates have been found in developing countries.  Haddad et al. (1996) find the rate in Morocco 
between 1984-89 is 6 percent; Tybout (1996) report a rate of 10 percent in Chile between 
1979-86; Roberts (1996) finds a rate of 11 percent in Colombia over 1977-85. (Haltiwanger 
et al. (2006)).  The data used here, covering 27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,   5
over the three year span from 2002 to 2005, falls in this range, with an average annualized 
exit rate of 7.6 percent. 
A number of papers have looked at the role of exit to understand its contribution to 
aggregate productivity.  While based on individual firm records, the data is used to generate 
aggregate exit rates by sector, size and/or age.  Early work focused on the US, but has since 
been extended to several OECD countries and to a number of middle income countries in 
Latin America and Central Europe.  Exiting firms are generally found to be less productive 
than incumbent firms.  However, the extent of the contribution of exiting firms to overall 
productivity or the extent of the productivity gap with continuing firms, various considerably 
across countries. Thus exiting firms account for over 50 percent of the productivity growth in 
Chile from 1985-1999, approximately 10 percent in Slovenia (1997-2001) and slightly 
negative contribution in Latvia (2001-2002).  Incumbents’ productivity is on average 63 
percent higher than exiters in Colombia (1987-1998) while it is 4 percent lower in Latvia. 
(Bartelsman et al. (2004)).  The literature is now turning to the question of what determines 
the variation in the extent of firm turnover and its contribution to productivity.  The quality of 
regulations can be important, in particular that more flexible product and labor market 
regulations can facilitate the reallocation of resources (Loayza et al. (2005), Pavcnik (2002)).   
This paper takes a different approach.  Rather than looking at aggregate exit rates, the 
paper looks at the exit decision from the perspective of the firm.  It covers 27 countries with a 
broad range of levels of income and institutional development.   It also takes advantage of a 
rich set of disaggregated measures of investment climate.  Thus multiple measures are 
available to capture each of the areas of the investment climate that are of interest.  And these 
measures vary sub-nationally.  This approach allows for a detailed investigation into how   6
firm characteristics can interact with a range of investment climate variables in determining 
who exits. 
When taking the firm perspective, models of exit generally emphasize the importance 
of productivity and productivity shocks in predicting exit.  Jovanovic’s (1982) model is based 
on firms that learn about their productivity as they operate.  Size and age are linked to exit 
rates as entering firms are generally small.  Based on their realized productivity, firms will 
either grow and continue in operations or decline and eventually exit.  In Hopenhayn (1992)’s 
model, firms have different productivity levels that evolve according to a Markov process.  If 
firms experience a series of negative productivity shocks, they exit.  Melitz (2002) and 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) extend the framework to include monopolistic and oligopolistic 
competition.  Again, younger firms tend to be smaller and to exit more frequently.   
Taking these models to the data, a number of papers look to explain such patterns, 
relying on firm characteristics such as age, size and sector.  Using census data from the 
United Kingdom, Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003) show the importance of these firm 
characteristics in predicting the exit of a firm.  Controlling for firm exit, they then show that 
greater competition can raise the productivity of continuing firms.  However, they do not link 
competition to firm exit itself.   
Bernard and Jensen (2002) look at the closing of manufacturing plants in the United 
States.  In addition to finding that size and age are negatively correlated with exit, they find 
that firms that are part of a US multinational face greater rates of exit once other firm 
characteristics are controlled for, as do plants that are part of multi-plant firms. They also find 
that increased competition, in the form of imports from low wage countries, significantly 
increases the probability of exit, particularly for low-wage and labor intensive plants.     7
One of the few papers that look at the issue of exit in a developing country is Frazer’s 
(2005) examination of exiting manufacturing firms in Ghana.  He finds that smaller and 
younger firms are more likely to exit.  He also finds that firms that exit are less productive, 
but that the effects are not large.  He posits that part of the explanation is the presence of 
policy distortions that keep the market from pushing out less efficient firms.  He does not 
include measures of policy distortions or indicators of a weak business environment to test 
this more directly, but his findings help motivate the importance of conducting such a test.     
The importance of ‘institutions’ or ‘social capital’ in understanding longer run growth 
(Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999);  Acemoglu and Johnson (2004)) has 
spawned an interest in disaggregating measures of institutions and examining their 
importance in other dimensions, such as firm entry, investment decisions and firm growth.  
Klapper et al. (2004) examine the effect of regulation across countries in Europe on entry 
rates by sector.  They find that regulations do retard entry significantly more in sectors that 
have ‘naturally high’ versus ‘naturally low’ rates of entry.  Johnson et al. (2002) show the 
importance of property rights in firms’ decision to invest; arguing that secure property rights 
trump access to finance in these decisions.  And Beck et al. (2005) show that financial and 
legal constraints affect firm growth, particular for small firms, with corruption having weaker 
effects.  In their work, the overall measure of property rights is important, but they find less 
evidence that more disaggregated measures are significant. 
This paper builds on these strands of literature to combine the roles of firm 
characteristics with disaggregated measures of the investment climate to the issue of exit.  
Covering 27 countries in Europe and Central Asia using the same survey instrument and 
sampling methodology, it can take advantage of both differences across countries as well as   8
across types of firms.  The survey instrument also includes a great deal of detail not only on 
firm characteristics, but on the quality of the business environment in which the firm 
operates.  It controls for multiple measures simultaneously, avoiding potential omitted 
variable bias present in studies that examine only a single dimension.  This is the first paper 
to use firm-level data on exits to study how investment climate conditions affect exit rates 
and differentially impact different types of firms.  
 
Impact of the investment climate 
 
  The paper tests for the importance of several dimensions of the investment climate.  
To facilitate their description, they are grouped into those whose effect is likely to raise the 
transaction costs of doing business (raising costs, delays) and those that affect market 
mechanisms more fundamentally.  More detailed information on specific variables is 
discussed in the data section below. 
1.  Factors raising transaction costs:  red tape, crime, bribes 
  Delays and inefficient delivery of services raise the costs of getting business done.  
Crime can be costly either in terms of goods lost or in terms of necessitating additional 
security measures.  Bribes too raise the cost of transactions.  These higher costs are 
hypothesized to raise the likelihood that firms will exit.  These additional expenses make it 
harder for firms to remain profitable and thus to remain in business.   
  The one variable in this category that has some potentially ambiguous role is that of 
bribes or corruption more broadly.  While bribes are an expense, broader corruption can 
potentially tilt market conditions in favor of certain firms.  Increasing attention is being 
focused on the role of corruption in development and trying to measure its cost, not simply in   9
the size of bribes paid but its impact on firm behavior (Svensson (2003) and (2005); Fisman 
and Svensson (2007)).  This paper uses a number of measures of corruption to examine its 
role on firm exit and the extent to which it amplifies or dampens the potential contribution 
that firm turnover can make to aggregate productivity.  It could be that in a more corrupt 
environment firms have to be even more productive to be able to survive.  This raising of the 
productivity threshold for survival would result in the productivity of exiting firms in corrupt 
areas being relatively higher than for those in less corrupt areas.  Alternatively, corruption 
could allow some very inefficient firms to remain in business.  If paying bribes can secure 
contracts or access to loans that would not otherwise have been granted based on the firm’s 
past performance, the interaction of corruption and productivity could be negative.   
The overall effects of corruption depend on two debates.  The first is whether 
corruption is seen as ‘grease money’ that speeds up transactions or ‘sand in the wheels’ that 
weighs down the ability to get things done and muddies the signals of quality in the market.  
If bribes are really grease money, areas of higher payments could be associated with lower 
exit rates as paying bribes helps keep things going.  Alternatively, if bribes are simply a cost, 
one would expect areas of higher corruption to be positively associated with higher exit rates.  
Which of these competing hypotheses is correct can be tested for by looking at the sign of the 
coefficient on the corruption variables. 
A second debate in the literature regards who is the target for unofficial payments and 
who is able to wield political influence to their benefit.  One view is that it is relatively good 
firms that are targeted by officials for additional payments, either because they attract 
attention more easily or due to their greater ability to pay.  The alternative view is that it is 
weaker firms that are targeted, either because they have no recourse against such requests or   10
need such ‘favors’ to remain in the game.
1  To separate these two views, it is important to 
look at both the sign of the corruption variable and the interaction of corruption and the 
performance of the firm.  If officials target ‘good performing firms’ and the bribes are ‘sand’, 
one would expect that the interaction term would be positively correlated with exiting.  Or if 
increasingly poor performing firms are faced with lots of additional ‘sand’, the interaction 
term would be negative on exiting. On the other hand, if ‘poor performing firms’ are the ones 
paying grease money, there could be a positive interaction term on exiting, whereas it would 
be negative if the productive firms are paying for the ‘grease.’ 
In a regression of the probability a firm will exit, interpreting the sign of the corruption 
coefficient and sign of a corruption-productivity interaction term  
    Bribes targeted to / paid by 
   Productive  firms  Unproductive  firms 
    Corruption coef. / Interaction term  Corruption coef. / Interaction term 
Corruption 
serves as: 
Sand  +   /    +  +    /     - 
Grease  -   /    -  -    /    + 
 
2.  Factors affecting market mechanisms:  competition, finance, property rights and 
competition 
  Competition: Greater competition is widely associated with weeding out inefficient 
firms.  Competitive pressure can come from greater exposure to imports, from multinationals 
operating locally and from other domestic firms.   
 Finance:  Access to finance and the development of financial markets help 
intermediate transactions and channel resources to their most productive uses, thereby 
facilitating investment and growth (Levine 2005).  With a more developed financial system, 
market signals are likely to be stronger and the greater discipline on the allocation of finance 
should facilitate pushing less productive firms to exit.   
                                                 
1 This debate also makes clear the need to control for potential endogeneity, which is discussed below.   11
Property rights:  The importance of property rights has been tested for in studies of 
firm growth (Beck et al. (2005)) as well as on firm investment decisions (Johnson et al. 
(2002)).  In the former case, property rights are not seen as important as financial constraints, 
particularly for small firms.  In the latter case, property rights were more significant in 
explaining a firm’s willingness to invest.  It should be noted that their strongest results, 
however, came from measures of corruption rather than confidence in courts themselves.  As 
corruption is examined separately, this section looks at issues of whether courts are believed 
to uphold property rights and on measures of the rule of law.  Stronger court systems and the 
rule of law are associated with the ability to conduct arms-length transactions and to punish 
contract violations.  As such, they broaden the set of market interactions likely to be 
undertaken, broader competition and discipline those that violate the rules.  Together, these 
are associated with expanding market discipline, which would likely raise exit rates, 
particularly of less productive firms. 
 
Who is relatively more affected by a weak investment climate? 
Firm Productivity 
Theoretical models emphasize the role of negative productivity shocks in explaining 
exit.  To the extent investment climate weaknesses raise the costs of doing business, these are 
likely to raise the productivity threshold associated with firm exit.  Firms would have to be 
otherwise that much more profitable to meet these higher costs and survive.  On the other 
hand, weaknesses in the investment climate that undermines market mechanisms could serve 
to shelter firms, particularly less efficient ones, from having to exit.  Thus the interactions of 
productivity with measures of broader access to finance, court strength and competition are   12
important to test for.  If the investment climate affects the relative productivity of exiting 
firms, this has implications on the efficiency of the allocation of resources in a country and 
thus on its overall level of productivity. 
Firm size 
The literature consistently finds that small firms are more likely to exit than larger 
firms (Roberts and Tybout (1996); Haltiwanger et al. (2004)).  Small firms are more likely to 
lack the scale needed to be more efficient and compete with larger competitors.  As many 
small firms are also new, they do not have the same experience or proven track record of 
succeeding in business.    The question here is whether investment climate conditions 
exacerbate these trends – or whether there are dimensions of the investment climate that 
affect them less.  Costs, particularly fixed costs that will be relatively higher for small firms, 
are likely to hurt smaller firms more.  Access to credit as well as property rights are touted as 
the benefits of firms formalizing and thus should be relatively more beneficial for SMEs 
compared to microfirms.   
One issue when looking at the effects of size is that the data source can matter.  
Studies that rely on census data can have truncated samples.  Many censuses only target firms 
of a certain size, typically 10 employees or more.  What is then recorded as ‘exit’ is a mixture 
between those firms that truly end operations and those that dip down below 10 employees 
but who remain in business.  The surveys used here also have a cutoff – but it is at 2 
employees.  Thus, all the firms in the original sample in 2002 have 2 employees or more.  In 
2005, those with only a single employee are still recorded as surviving, although they were 
not re-interviewed.  This makes it possible to look at the whole range of sizes of firms, with a   13
third of the sample having less than 10 employees.  Results confirm that there can be 
important differences between firms above and below the 10 employee cutoff. 
For studies with census data using a 10 employee cutoff, the smaller firms (i.e. just 
above 10) are more likely to exit (Roberts and Tybout (1996); Tybout (2000)).  However, in a 
study of microenterprises, Liedholm and Mead (1999) look only at enterprises with less than 
10 employees.  They find that young firms are most likely to exit, but that exit rates rise again 
as firms approach the 10 employee mark.  In the work here, having a single continuous size 
variable does show a negative coefficient on size.  However, creating dummy variables for 
three size categories (<10; 10-49, >49) allows for tests of whether there is a non-linearity in 
the effect of size.  The results show that there can be, particularly with respect to competition 
and some measures of property rights where it is the middle sized firms, those with 10-49 
employees, that are hit hardest.  Results by Aterido et al. (2009) also confirm that there are 
non-linearities by size in the impact of investment climate conditions on other dimensions of 
firm performance, such as growth. 
 
Firm Ownership: State Owned Enterprises 
The decision to keep an SOE operating can be related to a number of non-market 
oriented factors.  Their soft-budget constraint makes it possible to continue operations even if 
they lose money and are not efficient producers.  As such, it could be that their overall rate of 
exit is lower.  A second question is beyond a lower average rate of exit, whether they are 
relatively more sheltered from the conditions of operating in a weak investment climate.  If 
the state ownership shielded the firm from demands for bribes or gave the firm preferential 
access to the court system, SOEs could be less affected by investment climate conditions;   14
relative to private firms, the coefficient on the interaction term of an SOE dummy with 
investment climate conditions would then be negative.   
 
Firm ownership:  Foreign Direct Investment 
There is a debate as to whether foreign firms are a relatively stable source of 
investment or whether they are footloose, happy to accept incentives to set up production but 
quick to move to another location should there be difficulties in operations or a better 
incentive package offered elsewhere.  Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) examine whether foreign 
firms are more likely to exit, using census data from Indonesia.  They argue that they are less 
likely to – until one controls for size and productivity, and then they are more likely to exit 
than domestic firms thereby providing evidence that foreign firms can be more ‘footloose’.   
Firms with foreign partners may be affected differently than domestic firms by a weak 
investment climate.  In some cases, the foreign partner may be able to assist with providing 
an alternative solution to cope with a weak environment.  Thus, in the case of accessing 
finance; even if local financial markets are less developed, FDI firms should not find this as 
constraining.  However, in other cases, it could be that foreign firms are more affected.  This 
could be the case in navigating through red tape or dealing with corruption.  Here, foreign 
firms may have less understanding of how to operate and so are more likely to suffer in such 
an environment.  On the other hand, a local joint venture partner could be useful in such a 
situation (Smarzynska and Wei (2000)).  Distinguishing joint ventures from wholly- foreign 
owned firms can test for the importance of this in the exit decision. 
 
 
Empirical model of the exit decision 
   15
The model presented here assumes the entrepreneur maximizes the expected 
discounted value of net cash flows.  Each period the entrepreneur faces the choice as to 
whether to continue operations or to close down/sell the business.  If the firm remains in 
business, it faces a net profit function: 
   R(,i) = ()-f(i).   
The gross profits, , are a function of firm state variables, sector-specific market conditions, 
and , business environment conditions that vary across locations.  From this is subtracted the 
costs or investments associated with remaining in business.  These too could be a function of 
sector and location conditions.  The entrepreneur would receive if the firm was closed or 
sold.  Thus, the value function is: 
 ] | ) , , ( [ ) , , , ( sup , max ) , , ( 1 1 1 1 t t t t it t it I v V E i R V                  
Where  is the discount rate and It is the information known at time t.  Given the current 
variables of  and , if the expected discounted value of net profits is below, the firm will 
exit.  Thus, what is observed is a indicator function, Yt, such that Yt equals 1 if the firm exits 
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This equation is then estimated in reduced form, using a probit specification with firm 
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The data covers 27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as part of the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys conducted jointly by the World 
Bank and the EBRD.  The initial survey was fielded to 6667 firms in 2002, with a follow-up 
round in 2005 that covered 4813 of the same firms.  Table 1 provides basic summary 
statistics.  Firms were asked a number of questions on the business environment in which 
they operate, including both objective and subjective questions.  Objective questions include 
the monetary costs or time needed to comply with various regulations or procedures.  The 
range of topics covered includes: property rights, crime, access to finance and infrastructure 
services, corruption, cronyism, competition and regulation (see Table 2 for description and 
Table 3 for correlation matrix).  In addition, there is information on firm performance, 
including the size of the firm, its sales and employment growth in the previous 3 years and 
many characteristics of the firm. 
Measuring ‘exit’ 
The measure of ‘exit’ is defined in two ways.  The stricter definition is ‘observed 
exits’.  It is based on confirmation that the business interviewed in 2002 had indeed closed or 
gone out of business by 2005.  However, this was not possible to ascertain with certainty in 
many cases as the entrepreneurs could not always be located.  So, a second definition is also 
used.  This includes all the ‘observed exits’, plus those cases where enumerators were unable 
to locate the enterprise – it was no longer in operation at the same location or with the same 
phone number and no new contact information was available with the same firm name.  
Firms that were acquired and remained in the same location are classified as survivors.  Only 
if they moved and changed their name and contact information would the firm be classified 
as an exit.  It is possible that in this second measure, some firms did in fact remain in   17
operations at another location.  However, this noise in the measurement would work to make 
it harder to find robust patterns in the data. 
In both cases, the definitions are clear to exclude as exits those firms that did not 
participate a second time.  There are two possible sources of attrition.  From the first survey, 
respondents were asked for permission to return again 3 years later.  In three-quarters of the 
cases, permission was granted.  One potential concern is that there is selection bias based on 
which firms granted permission.  A Heckman selection model was run, including firm 
characteristics (size, age, ownership, productivity) as well as sector dummies and country 
dummies.  The seniority of the respondent was found to be significantly correlated with 
whether permission was given (those who were not CEOs or the owner were less likely to 
give permission), but was uncorrelated with subsequent exit or survival.  The null hypothesis 
of the independence of the two regressions could not be rejected at the 0.4 level.  
Of those that did give permission, attempts were made to re-contact all of them.  A 
second source of potential attrition is that of those that were found, not all did in fact answer 
the survey.  While this can be of concern for other panel analyses, here it is not of concern.  
This paper does not rely on the answers to the second questionnaire.  Even if they did not 
answer the questionnaire a second time, their continuation in business was confirmed and so 
they can be included as a surviving firm.   
The results shown primarily use the second definition of exit as this allows for the 
inclusion of more countries (5 countries did not distinguish between those that were verified 
as closed) and provide a significant number of additional instances of exiting. However, as 
Table 8a demonstrates, repeating the regressions using the more restrictive definition, the 
results are qualitatively the same.   18
One potential issue for the interpretation of the results is the assumption of whether or 
not an ‘exit’ should be understood as a failure.  Exits are often assumed to be failures; that 
firms were unable to continue in operations, either at all or at that location.  Thus our 
interpretation of a weaker investment climate leading to greater exits is one where firms are 
either driven out of business or move to ‘greener pastures’ (i.e. it is not an instance of failure 
on the part of the firm, but on the part of the location to support that firm).  However, it is 
possible that a subset of firms captured in our measure are in fact examples of success – i.e. 
firms exit because they were acquired or merged with another firm, and thus moved (possibly 
within the same city) with a new name.
2  For these firms, the quality of the investment 
climate did not detract from their performance; it is even possible that their success in an 
otherwise poor investment climate is exactly what made them attractive for acquisition.
3  
Unfortunately we cannot know how many instances we have of this.  But to the extent that 
‘successful’ firms are in our pool of exiters, they would likely bias against finding significant 
results of a weak investment climate increasing exit rates.  Table 8 shows robustness checks 
that look at subsets of exiting firms based on other information in the 2002 data to classify 
them as more likely to be failures.  Table 8b looks at those firms that were already in arrears 
in 2002.  Table 8c excludes those firms that are most likely to be ‘good performers/attractive 
targets’, i.e. those that are not in arrears and are above their city-sector median price-cost 
                                                 
2 Within this group of acquired firms, recall that those that continue to operate in the same location or with the 
same name remain in the sample as survivors.   This is most easily confirmed by the presence of 29 firms that 
were acquired by a foreign firm during the 3 intervening years (and answered both questionnaires).  These 
acquisitions are not represented as ‘exits’ in the data. 
3 There is a hypothesis that in an area of corruption or lots of red tape is precisely when having a local partner is 
more desirable.  This is particularly true for multinationals that are likely to be less well situated to navigate this 
environment.  This can be tested for looking at whether JV or wholly owned foreign firms are more likely to be 
in locations of higher corruption and if JVs are then significantly less likely to exit from these locations.  The 
results do confirm that joint venture firms are significantly less likely to be impacted by the negative effects of 
cronyism, although other measures of corruption do not show any difference across JVs versus wholly owned 
foreign firms.   19
margins and city-sector median capacity utilization.  The results are robust to both 
definitions, although the competition and finance variables are weaker when limited to firms 
in arrears. 
 
Measuring the investment climate 
  The variables on the investment climate include a large set of potential indicators.  
Government services and red tape:  the number of days it takes to clear customs; the share of 
production lost due to power outages; the time management spends dealing with officials; 
and the burden of labor regulations in keeping firms from their desired level of employment. 
Corruption:  Measures of corruption are the share of sales paid as a bribes to help ‘get 
things done’; the sale of a government contract that is paid as a bribe, as well as how 
frequently firms perceive bribes as being paid ‘to get things done’.  There are also questions 
on the degree of uncertainty about the size of the expected gift and whether firms have 
recourse should a bribe be demanded.   
Competition:  While other studies have looked at concentration ratios, this 
information is not available for this dataset as it uses a sample of firms.  Rather, entrepreneurs 
rank the extent of competition from imports, pressure to either reduce costs or increase 
innovation from domestic or foreign sources.  It also includes a measure of the degree of anti-
competitive practices as an obstacle entrepreneurs face in operating and expanding their 
businesses. 
Access to finance: Two measures are constructed based on the incidence of borrowing 
with the sector-location of the firm:  the share of firms that have a loan, and the share of 
financing that comes from formal sources.  Two additional measures are the degree to which   20
access to capital or the cost of capital is perceived to be an obstacle to the operation and 
growth of a business.   
Property rights and court strength:  This set looks more at the efficacy of the judicial 
system and contractual rights vis a vis other private parties.  It includes the confidence in the 
judicial system to uphold property rights, the efficiency of the legal process, security of titles 
to land, and the extent of contract violations with buyers and suppliers. 
The investment climate variables described above could potentially be endogenous to 
the firm’s subsequent exit.  If the firm is performing poorly, it could be more likely to report 
that external constraints are larger.  Or, it could be that better performing firms experience 
constraints as more binding (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2009)).  On the other hand, 
with a lag of up to three years between the surveys, this is less of an issue than a purely 
contemporaneous regression of performance on investment climate responses.  The concern 
is further mitigated by averaging the indicators by the city in which the firm is located.
4  
Many regulations or public services either have a local component or are implemented / 
enforced locally so that it is meaningful to look for variation at a sub-national level.   
 
Results 
Table 4 reports the effect of firm characteristics in predicting exit.  Overall, 22.5 
percent of firms exited over the three years.  The most significant predictor of exit is firm 
size.  This finding is consistent with the broader literature; that turnover is highest among the 
smallest firms.  For a ten percent increase in employment size, the probability of exit falls by 
3 percent.  Age, too, is significantly negatively associated with exit.  Looking at exporters 
                                                 
4 In the case of competition, the city-sector seemed more appropriate.  Results were repeated using city-sector 
averaging and were consistent.   21
and firms with foreign owners, there is no significant association with exiting.  However, 
state owned enterprises are significantly less likely to exit; their exit rates are about one third 
lower than private firms.  Those SOEs that remain are also less productive – their average 
value added per worker is on par with that of the average exiting private firm.  Firms with 
rising sales are less likely to exit, while those with falling sales are more likely to exit, but the 
effects are not statistically significant.  The overall level of capacity utilization is not found to 
be significant.  Looking across the regions in the area, firms in the EU accession countries are 
significantly less likely to exit than those in CIS countries.  Within sectors, those in retail 
trade are the most likely to exit.  These results all include country dummies to capture 
differences in level of income, phases of the business cycle, macroeconomic conditions etc.  
Results that instead controlled  for these country characteristics directly were very similar and 
so are not reported here.  What is important, however, is that these patterns hold both across 
and within countries.  The full set of firm characteristics are included in all the regressions as 
controls, but are not reported due to space constraints.   
Table 5 provides the results of combining measures from each investment climate 
thematic category simultaneously.  The richness of the dataset allows for additional variables 
to be substituted.   Doing so produced similar results, confirming the robustness of the 
findings presented here.  That so many variables remain significant to the inclusion of other 
variables also assuages fears that any given variable could be proxying for a broader set of 
conditions. 
Two sets of measures are found to raise the probability of exit:  measures of red tape 
and bribes.   Management time spent with officials is associated with higher rates of exit.   
Greater frequency of bribes also raises the probability of exit.  The result on the size of the   22
bribe paid is somewhat smaller.  Controlling for these other measures of bribes, greater 
certainty about the amount of bribe to be paid lowers the probability of exit as does having 
recourse to paying bribes.  Together these results strongly support the importance of cutting 
down on corruption to reduce exit rates.  Additional payments are not the only way that 
corruption can be manifest.  Having undue influence in setting policies and regulations is 
another.  In areas where more firms report that large firms exert such influence, firms are 
significantly more likely to exit, although the effect is less significant across countries.  
On the other hand, variables more closely associated with undermining market 
mechanisms were found to lower the probability of firm exit.  The lower the extent of 
competition, the lower the rate of exit.  The strongest effects come from domestic pressure to 
cut costs or to introduce new products, followed by pressure from customers.  Pressure from 
foreign producers and competition from imports were not statistically significant overall.  For 
finance, what is significant is the share of firms in a location-sector that have a loan.  Exit 
rates of firms that are located in an area where fewer firms have loans experience lower rates 
of exit; locations with more developed financial systems are more dynamic.  In contrast, 
variables capturing the cost of finance were not significant. Weaknesses in the legal system 
were also strongly associated with higher rates of exit.   
Table 5 column 4 repeats the regression, this time including cross-country variation.  
Instead of country dummies, a number of country controls are included.  The results are very 
similar.  The final column then repeats the regression of column 3, but only for small, 
domestically owned firms.  This is to test for the possibility of a location selection bias.  
Multinational corporations – and likely larger domestic firms – are more likely to consider 
multiple locations for their operations.  This could induce a selection bias, with firms   23
choosing to be in locations that minimize their chances of exit.  Excluding these firms 
confirms the robustness of the results. 
  
Are more productive firms disproportionately hurt by a weak investment climate? 
  
Table 6 reports the effects of interacting the investment climate measures with firm 
productivity to see what effects they would have on the compositional effect of exiting firms.  
The effect of productivity itself helps to lower the probability of exit, although it is not 
always statistically significant.  What is true is that the compositional effect all works in the 
same direction; weaknesses in the investment climate are associated with raising the 
probability that more productive firms exit. 
  Take bribes.  Now the direct effect is actually insignificant.  But the interaction term 
is significant and positive.  For bribes above the median level of frequency, more productive 
firms are more likely to exit.  Only at low levels of bribes does greater productivity raise the 
probability of survival.  For competition, the direct effect of the lack of competition still 
lowers the probability of exit.  But the interaction with productivity is also large and positive.  
Only for measures of competition stronger than the median point of the scale (i.e. below 4) is 
the overall effect of increasing productivity decreasing the probability of exit.  The same is 
true for finance and property rights; only in those environments where they are above the 
median strength does productivity contribute to greater probabilities of survival.  In locations 
with less developed financial and legal infrastructure, the effect is to increase the probability 
that productive firms will exit.    24
  Robustness checks: A number of robustness checks were used.  The first set deals 
with altering the definition of exit.  As mentioned in the description of the data, there is a 
potential that some of the firms that are included as ‘exiting’ were in fact in business but 
some reason were not found by the enumerators.  Table 7a reports the results just looking at 
those for which the enumerators could verify that the firm had gone out of business.  The 
pattern of the results holds although the coefficients are somewhat smaller, particularly for 
competition.  
Another question is whether the finding that more productive firms are likely to exit 
where investment climates are weak should be understood as good firms failing or leaving for 
greener pastures or whether they represent ‘good exits’, i.e. they were attractive acquisition 
targets.  Table 7b with ‘bad exits 1’ looks at those firms that were already in arrears in 2002.  
These are more likely exits that ended in failure.  ‘Bad exits 2’ removes the better performing 
firms that might be attractive acquisition firms, i.e. those with above city-sector median 
operating margins and above city-sector median capacity utilization.
5  For both sets, the 
results do hold.  The coefficients drop somewhat in the case of only ‘bad exit 1’ (in arrears) 
and the market cleansing effects are more apparent with ‘bad exit 2’.  The overall story can 
be understood as one where weak investment climates are more likely to push out more 
productive firms. 
As a further robustness check, additional measures of good performance were used.  
In addition to firm productivity, operating margins and capacity utilization were tested.  The 
results using operating margin are even larger than using productivity, particularly the effects 
of competitive pressure and court strength.  For capacity utilization, results on bribes remain 
particularly strong, but some of the interactions otherwise lose significance.  Additional 
                                                 
5 Strictly, it is very closely aligned with the true operating margin, but it does exclude some overhead costs.   25
measures such as whether a firm had ISO certification, licenses foreign technology generated 
similar patterns, but were not as robust. 
Are smaller firms disproportionately hurt by a weak investment climate? 
 
Access to external finance is a key area where smaller firms are disproportionately 
hurt.  However, as Table 8 illustrates, the smallest firms are not the ones most hurt by a lack 
of property rights.  In addition to the reported measure on insecure property rights, variables 
of limited access to land titles, contract violations and inefficient judiciary are all less of an 
obstacle for small firms than for large firms.  With small firms less likely to own land, engage 
in formal contracts with suppliers or use the courts, it is not surprising that small firms are 
less affected by how well they are functioning.  For large firms, they are more likely to 
engage in arms length transactions and there are often fewer acceptable alternative means of 
resolving disputes than the court system.  Transparency about the content of laws and 
regulations also serves to help larger firms relative to smaller firms.  So in all these cases, 
larger firms are hurt relatively more by weak property rights or poorly functioning courts. 
Bribes have a larger impact on mid-sized firms.  To the extent that bribes represent a 
fixed cost, they would be proportionately higher for small firms.  But as the smallest firms 
have less ability to pay, larger firms may be targeted more for payments.   SMEs would be 
subject to the fuller array of regulations while more microenterprises are generally not, it is 
not surprising the concerns of undue influence are less of a constraint for the smallest firms.  
However to the extent that policy makers are keen to encourage firms to become formal, 
these results show that how regulations are passed and whose interests they serve will have 
an important impact in helping make it attractive for firms to become fully formal firms.   26
The effect of competition is also significant for firms in the 10-49 employee range.  In 
fact, the effect is double that of larger firms. That many smaller firms are not necessarily 
aiming to grow (Maloney (2004); Lindhold and Mead (1999)) and thus less concerned about 
being too competitive, it is not altogether surprising that they respond least to potential 
sources of competition.  For firms reaching past the 10 employee mark and having to comply 
with more regulations, and entering markets where they are starting to be in more direct 
competition with larger players, competition is felt more keenly.   
Are younger firms disproportionately hurt by a weak investment climate? 
 
Many of the arguments here mirror those of smaller firms.  But one would expect that 
the degree of competition may matter more for younger firms as they have less of a proven 
trackrecord of succeeding in business.
6  As shown in Table 9, greater competition does raise 
the probability of exit – and particularly for the youngest firms.  For old firms (operating 15 
years or more), there is virtually no effect of competition on their exit rates.   
Are SOEs relatively more sheltered from weak investment climates? 
 
Looking at the results, it is true that the coefficient on SOEs itself is often 
significantly negative.  SOEs do not exit as frequently as their private sector counterparts, 
controlling for age, size, export orientation, sector, capacity utilization and trend in sales.  
This is true controlling for countries too.  However, there is no strong pattern interacting a 
dummy for SOEs with investment climate conditions.  Thus the data does not support the 
general hypothesis that SOEs enjoy greater shelter from IC conditions.  There is an average 
effect across the group, but IC conditions then do not have a differential impact. 
                                                 
6 Of course the degree of competition can affect entry and therefore the number of young firms that are there.  
We cannot control for this with this dataset.   27
One way to control for the average level of assistance SOEs receive is to examine a 
variable that indicates whether SOEs receive government subsidies or assistance.  Half of the 
SOEs report receiving direct subsidies.  Distinguishing SOEs with and without subsidies, one 
finds those with subsidies have somewhat more negative interaction terms with IC conditions 
indicating that they are sheltered somewhat, but the difference is not significant at the 5% 
level.  Thus, SOEs are more likely to survive, but it is not simply due to facing less harsh 
investment climate conditions. 
 
Are firms with foreign partners or owners more or less sheltered from weak investment 
climates? 
 
Foreign firms could be less sheltered from a weak investment climate if they have less 
experience in how to operate in a weaker investment climate.  Overall, this is not found in the 
data.  Distinguishing between joint ventures and wholly foreign owned firms allows for the 
hypothesis to be refined.  If having local knowledge or connections matters, joint venture are 
better able to deal with issues of red tape or corruption than wholly foreign owned firms.  The 
results do confirm that joint venture firms are significantly less likely to be impacted by the 
negative effects of cronyism, although other measures of corruption do not show any 
difference across JVs versus wholly owned foreign firms. 
Foreign firms might also be more sheltered from a weak investment climate if they 
are able to locate in special economic zones, have access to foreign finance or enjoy 
exceptions to certain regulatory or taxation obligations.  However, one potential concern is if 
there is a selection bias of foreign firms; that they would only have located in areas with a 
better investment climate so that a lack of a finding that investment climate affects their rate 
of exit is due to the fact that MNCs do not enter in poorer investment climate areas to begin   28
with.  For many smaller domestically owned firms, they are less mobile, they will have been 
established where the entrepreneur lived.  For larger domestic firms, they too would be more 
mobile in choosing their locations within the country.  Restricting the sample to only larger 
firms (reported are cutoffs of 50 or more employees), FDI firms do appear to be burdened 
more by some IC conditions.  Thus, where the influence of big corporations or cronies is 
particularly strong, foreign firms are more likely to exit.  If the judiciary is inefficient and/or 
contract violations are more numerous, again FDI is more likely to exit.  On the other hand, 
on issues where larger firms would have recourse to deal with weak environments, (e.g. 
access to finance, ability to provide own generator to avoid reliance on an unpredictable 
public grid), there is no significant difference between foreign firms and large domestic ones. 
Are there differences by level of institutional development? 
Table 11 then looks to see if these results are affected by the level of financial and 
legal development of a country.  The sample is split into countries with greater financial 
development, as measured as domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP.  Rates 
of exit are lower in countries with less developed financial systems.  Within each sample, 
measures of a firm’s own access to finance remains a significant variable in less financially 
developed countries, but not in more developed countries.  In the more financially developed 
countries, it is the cost of finance that remains significant.  
Table 11 divides countries using the Kaufmann-Kraay ‘rule of law’ variable.  Those 
below the average level are classified as ‘poor’ rule of law, those above as ‘stronger’.  A 
second classification uses the Doing Business measure of how long it would take for a firm to 
follow all the official procedures involved with bankruptcy.   Rates of exit are again higher in 
countries with better rule of law.  For those with weaker rule of law, costs associated with   29
enforcing contracts, time to get permits and court delays all serve to raise the rates of exit, but 
are no longer significant in countries with a stronger rule of law or more efficient bankruptcy 
proceedings.
7  If firms can turn to the legal system and courts to support their property rights, 
there are fewer violations and their impact is less detrimental as there are better procedures 




The results confirm that weaknesses in the investment climate do impact the 
probability that firms will exit.  And these effects vary in important ways across firms.   Exit 
rates are generally higher for small and young firms – and these patterns are exacerbated by 
less access to finance and less efficient government services.  However, there are also 
dimensions of the investment climate that impact larger firms more, including property rights 
protection, corruption, cronyism and anticompetitive practices.  The effects can be non-linear, 
with SMEs (10-50 employees) hurt the most.  These findings reinforce the importance of 
looking at the full spectrum of firm sizes – not just at those above a certain minimum number 
of employees – in drawing conclusions about the impact on small firms.   
The effects of the investment climate on the relative productivity of exiting firms are 
particularly striking.   Those dimensions of a weak investment climate that act increase 
transaction costs drive out firms – including more productive ones.  Other areas demonstrate 
the importance of developed market institutions (courts, competition and finance) in ensuring 
greater efficiency in the composition of surviving firms.   
                                                 
7  This work is being extended to look at how the impact of the investment climate could vary across groups of 
countries, looking at the EU accession countries, remaining Eastern Europe countries and former members of 
the Soviet Union.  Bribes act more like ‘sand’ in the EU accession countries, while working more like grease in 
the Balkan region.  This will be explore in future research.   30
The two broad dimensions of the investment climate also reinforce each other.  Where 
the rule of law is stronger, these effects of increased costs of doing business are no longer as 
significant – there are fewer instances of such costs and there is a mechanism for redressing 
them.  Improving the investment climate will not necessarily reduce the overall rate of firm 
exit, but it will make it more likely that more productive firms survive.  31
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Table 1a:  Number of observations 
Number of firms in 2002  6,667 
     Out of which:   
     Number of firms that gave permission to be re-contacted in 2005  4,870 
          Out of which:    
          Number of firms that had exited by 2005  1,097 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics – Firm Characteristics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Size  143.43  528.49  2  9960 
Age  14.68  18.28  3  202 
Exporter  0.25  0.44  0  1 
Fdi  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Soe  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Utilization  79.95  20.22  1  100 
Sales up  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Sales down  0.27  0.44  0  1 
  
Table 1c:  Sectoral Coverage 
Sector  # firms  Freq 
Mining  78  1% 
Construction  808  12% 
Manufacturing  1685  25% 
Transport  524  8% 
Trade  2027  30% 
Real estate  675  10% 
Hotels and Restaurant  457  7% 
Other services  413  6% 
 
 
Table 1d:  Exiting and surviving firms 
  Exiting firms  Surviving firms 
Average size  88  148 
Average age  12.5  15.7 
Average productivity ($VA/L)  8532  7819 
 
Table 1e:  Relative productivity of surviving firm to exiting firm 






EU accession  1.16 
Non-EU accession  0.93 
SOE survivor to private exiter  0.95   35
  
Table 2a:  Indicators of weak investment climate 
(higher values correspond to greater costs, delays, obstacles) 
IC variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Bribe frequency  2.63  1.50  1  6 
Bribe amount  1.51  3.19  0  50 
Influence of big firms  1.64  1.34  0  4 
Influence of cronies  1.52  1.41  0  4 
Inefficient judiciary  2.05  1.08  1  4 
Weak title to land  1.60  0.94  1  4 
Mgmt time  7.55  11.59  0  90 
Protection pay  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Customs (time to clear)  3.87  6.88  0  90 
Instability  2.79  1.12  1  4 
Labor regulation distortion  0.14  0.21  0  2 
Contract violations  2.23  1.08  1  4 
Lack access to finance  2.32  1.16  1  4 
Cost of finance  2.53  1.13  1  4 
 
 
Table 2b:  Indicators of stronger market institutions 
IC variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Property rights  3.52  1.39  1  6 
Formal finance  11.99  23.70  0  100 
Have external loan  0.40  0.49  0  1 
Competition from imports  2.52  1.47  0  5 
Customer pressure to innovate  2.91  0.99  1  4 
Customer pressure to cut costs  2.78  1.03  1  4 
Domestic pressure to innovate  2.74  1.02  1  4 
Domestic pressure to cut costs  2.67  1.06  1  4 
Foreign pressure to innovate  2.03  1.10  1  4 
Foreign pressure to cut costs  1.98  1.09  1  4 
Bribe recourse  2.94  1.52  1  6 
Bribe certainty  2.67  1.64  1  6 
Information about law  3.93  1.49  1  6 
   36
 
 
Table 3:  Correlation Matrix  
  





















Size    1.000                            
Age    0.415* 1.000                           
Exporter    0.308* 0.14*  1.000                         
FDI    0.14* -0.11*  0.244* 1.000                       
SOE    0.34*  0.390  0.017 -0.154* 1.000                     
Utilization    0.003 -0.071* -0.023 0.041* -0.022  1.000                   
Sales up    0.161* -0.056 0.138* 0.102* -0.022  0.11*  1.000                 
Sales down    -0.13*  0.063*  -0.108*  -0.077*  0.002  -0.185*  -0.67*  1.000                 
Labor reg. distortion    -0.025*  0.003  -0.001  -0.002  0.003  -0.019  0.098*  -0.069*  1.000               
Freq. of bribes    0.074*  -0.07*  -0.053*  0.015  0.023  -0.020  0.057*  -0.019  0.193*  1.000             
Influence of big firms    -0.028*  0.073*  0.092*  -0.008  -0.020  -0.032*  -0.027*  0.063*  0.119*  -0.147*  1.000           
Share with a loan    -0.009  0.039*  0.096*  0.052*  -0.035*  0.020  0.116*  -0.093*  -0.023  -0.372*  0.189*  1.000         
Cost of finance    -0.017  0.078*  0.019  -0.015  0.017  -0.037*  -0.032*  0.075*  0.129*  0.164*  0.401*  0.06*  1.000       
Contract violations    0.048*  0.034*  0.086*  0.037*  0.027*  0.008  0.06*  -0.018  0.065*  0.166*  0.541*  0.237*  0.378*  1.000     
Inefficient legal sys    0.000  0.089*  0.084*  0.044*  0.013  0.006  0.028*  0.013  0.25*  0.161*  0.536*  0.192*  0.449*  0.682*  1.000   
Strength of courts    0.035*  0.007  -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.008  0.003  -0.008  -0.066*  -0.391*  0.017  0.018  -0.078* -0.131*  -0.249*  1.000 
Pressure to innovate    0.007  0.05*  0.056*  -0.009  -0.03*  0.039*  0.092*  -0.101*  -0.009  -0.243*  0.399*  0.404*  0.206*  0.355*  0.263*  0.068* 
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Table 4:  Firm Characteristics and Exit Rates 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Employees  -0.03     -0.03 
   (8.32)***     (6.66)*** 
Age     -0.04  -0.01 
      (4.70)***  (1.47) 
Exporter  0.03  0.03  0.03 
   (1.48)  (1.59)  (1.52) 
FDI  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   (1.22)  (1.27)  (1.25) 
SOE  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08 
   (4.51)***  (4.14)***  (4.45)*** 
Utilization  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   (0.75)  (0.69)  (0.79) 
Sales up  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Sales down  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.66)  (0.63)  (0.66) 
EU  -0.13  -0.12  -0.13 
   (2.73)***  (2.49)***  (2.67)*** 
Balkan  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06 
   (1.08)  (1.01)  (1.02) 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  4799  4813  4668 
LR chi2  469.20  425.61  473.90 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses                      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Probit regression on probability a firm exits, marginal effects reported.                  38
  
Table 5:  Investment Climate and Exit Rates 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Lnsize  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
   (7.08)***  (7.07)***  (7.04)***  (7.04)***  (7.04)*** 
Management time with officials  0.04    0.03  0.04  0.053 
   (1.68)*    (1.42)  (1.50)  (1.54) 
Delays through customs     0.09       
    (1.27)       
Bribe frequency  0.07    0.06  0.05  0.04 
   (2.12)**    (2.09)**  (1.90)*  (1.89)* 
Influence of big firms    0.09  0.08  0.04  0.05 
     (3.03)***  (1.79)*  (1.28)  (1.67) 
Limited pressure to innovate  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.08  -0.06 
   (2.52)**  (2.31)**  (2.21)**  (1.91)*  (2.12)** 
Limited financial access  -0.14     -0.10  -0.12  -0.12 
   (1.82)*     (1.80)*  (1.97)**  (1.89)* 
Cost of finance     -0.00       
      (0.04)       
Insecure property rights  -0.06  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  -0.09 
   (1.72)*  (2.40)**  (2.19)**  (1.91)*  (2.30)** 
Lack of transparency of law    -0.08  -0.09  -0.01  -0.08 
     (2.81)***  (2.94)***  (0.89)  (2.63)*** 
Firm characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  4777  4777  4777  4777  3376 
LR chi2  512.74  511.12  508.95  508.95  528.41 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Probit regressions on probability a firm exits, marginal effects are reported. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(4) includes GDP per capita, GDP growth,  inflation, and openness to trade as country controls. 



















Lnproductivity -0.106  -0.118 -0.135 -0.053  -0.147 
 (2.86)***  (2.39)**  (2.37)**  (2.01)**  (2.09)** 
IC variable  0.101  -0.004  -0.130  -0.327  -0.113 
 (1.72)*  (0.09)  (2.63)***  (2.35)**  (2.34)** 
IC× lnproductivity  0.041  0.049  0.046  0.104  0.038 
 (1.61)  (2.67)***  (2.18)**  (1.65)  (1.92)* 
Obs 2759  2759  2759  2759  2759 
LR chi2  322.45  324.26  321.07  319.22  320.02 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   
All regressions have controls for firm characteristics, the other investment climate variables, sector, city and country 
dummies included. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.   39
Table 7:  Using Alternative Measures of Exit 
 















Lnproductivity -0.054  -0.014 -0.035  -0.032  -0.073 
 (1.83)*  (1.34)  (1.27)  (2.13)**  (1.61) 
IC variable  0.002  -0.002  0.014  -0.162  0.012 
 (0.07)  (0.23)  (0.47)  (1.98)**  (0.39) 
IC × lnprod  0.021  0.010  0.012  0.077  0.020 
 (1.98)**  (1.90)*  (1.58)  (2.01)**  (1.54) 
Observations 2323  2323  2323  2323  2323 
LR chi2  89.14  88.19  85.39  88.16  87.43 


















Lnproductivity -0.014  -0.038 -0.011 -0.020 -0.079 
 (1.87)*  (1.70)*  (1.64)  (2.74)***  (2.54)** 
IC variable  -0.002  -0.018  0.029  -0.019  -0.056 
 (0.28)  (0.95)  (1.28)  (2.46)**  (2.60)*** 
IC × lnprod  0.010  0.015  0.003  0.012  0.021 
 (2.59)***  (1.84)*  (1.43)  (3.61)***  (2.47)** 
Observations 2649  2649  2649  2649  2649 
LR chi2  120.89  115.70  114.26  126.22  121.24 


















Lnproductivity -0.022 -0.072 -0.109 -0.020  -0.154 
 (1.48)  (1.57)  (2.04)**  (1.31)  (2.35)** 
IC variable  0.001  0.012  -0.099  -0.019  -0.108 
 (0.07)  (0.31)  (2.15)**  (1.26)  (2.42)** 
IC × lnprod  0.018  0.029  0.038  0.014  0.042 
 (2.34)**  (1.75)*  (1.92)*  (2.13)**  (2.25)** 
Observations 2759  2759  2759  2759  2759 
LR chi2  295.58  293.27  292.73  292.13  295.02 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   
All regressions have controls for firm characteristics, other investment climate variables and sector, city and country dummies 
included.   40
Table 8:  Investment Climate Impact by Size 
  











SMEs (10-50 employees)  -0.07  -0.02  -0.26  -0.023  0.07 
   (0.68)  (0.19)  (2.58)***  (0.80)  (0.57) 
Large (>50 employees)  0.17  -0.21  -0.20  -0.025  0.13 
   (1.28)  (2.50)**  (1.87)*  (0.95)  (0.94) 
IC variable  0.03  0.06  -0.05  -0.020  -0.12 
   (1.78)*  (1.84)*  (1.16)  (2.71)***  (3.16)*** 
SME× IC variable  0.03  0.02  0.10  0.012  0.03 
   (1.98)**  (1.71)*  (2.44)**  (1.26)  (0.72) 
Large× IC variable  -0.01  -0.05  0.05  0.03  0.06 
   (2.07)**  (1.56)  (1.11)  (3.08) ***  (1.66)* 
Sector dum  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cntry dum  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  4777  4777  4777  4777  4777 
LR chi2  468.33  468.51  469.55  450.01  468.21 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   




Table 9:  Investment Climate by Age of Firm 
  
Management 








Lnsize  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
   (7.07)***  (7.15)***  (7.03)***  (7.07)***  (6.97)*** 
mid age firm  -0.05  0.39  0.19  0.21  0.22 
   (0.37)  (2.27)**  (2.12)**  (2.00)**  (1.82)* 
old firm  -0.18  0.09  0.23  0.14  0.23 
   (1.43)  (0.49)  (2.23)**  (1.20)  (1.70)* 
IC variable  0.07  0.15  -0.20  -0.12  -0.10 
   (1.75)*  (3.72)***  (3.78)***  (3.10)***  (2.80)*** 
mid age x IC variable  0.02  0.02  0.10  0.09  0.07 
   (0.48)  (1.79)*  (2.01)**  (1.91)*  (1.72)* 
old firm×IC variable  -0.06  -0.09  0.17  0.06  -0.03 
   (1.43)  (2.19)**  (1.26)  (1.23)  (1.03) 
Sector, cntry dum  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  4777  4777  4777  4777  4777 
LR chi2  485.25  493.81  489.72  484.93  482.58 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   
All regressions have controls for firm characteristics, other investment climate variables and sector, city and country 
dummies included. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   41
 
Table 10:  Investment Climate by Ownership 
  
Management 








FDI  -0.11  -0.10  -0.21  -0.21  -0.15 
   (2.42)**  (2.04)**  (2.42)**  (2.42)**  (1.85)* 
IC variable  0.06  0.09  0.06  0.06  0.05 
   (1.94)*  (1.94)*  (1.94)*  (1.94)*  (1.41) 
FDI×IC variable  0.03  -0.09  0.04  0.04  0.10 
   (1.48)  (1.34)  (1.68)*  (1.52)  (2.10)** 
Sector, Cntry dum  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  4777  4777  4777  4777  4777 
LR chi2  487.47  497.64  487.47  487.47  481.43 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   
All regressions have controls for firm characteristics, other investment climate variables and sector, city and country dummies 
included.    42
Table 11:  Does the Impact Vary Across Countries by the Level of Financial Development and Rule of Law? 
 
Table11a:  Access and cost of finance by financial development 










Lnsize  -0.027 -0.027 -0.018 -0.031 -0.018 -0.029 
  (5.62)*** (5.64)*** (2.98)*** (3.59)*** (3.07)*** (3.36)*** 
gdppc_us  0.016 0.017 0.032 -0.186 0.027 -0.112 
 (1.44)  (1.43)  (2.68)***  (4.18)***  (2.30)**  (2.21)** 
gdppc_gr  -0.005 -0.006 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.025 
 (2.19)**  (2.64)***  (1.04)  (0.25)  (0.80)  (1.75)* 
EU  -0.101  -0.113      
  (4.42)***  (4.95)***      
Balkan  -0.086  -0.090      
  (4.86)***  (5.02)***      
Lack fin access  0.076    0.051  0.075     
 (3.60)***    (2.14)**  (1.16)     
Cost of fin    0.042      0.003  0.191 
   (2.33)**     (0.15)  (2.82)*** 
Sector dum  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4513 4513 3109 1174 3109 1174 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   
All regressions have controls for firm characteristics, other investment climate variables and sector and city dummies included. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
 
 
Table 11b:  Level of legal development and the effect of weak property rights








Poor rule of law  Strong rule of 
law 
Poor rule of 
law 
Strong rule of 
law 
Cost to enforce   0.100  -0.033  0.087  0.065         
contracts  (3.12)***  (0.56)  (2.44)**  (1.39)       
Time to get permits          0.131  -0.052     
         (2.15)**  (0.43)     
Court delays              0.093  -0.029 
             (2.21)**  (0.45) 
Sector dum  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country dum  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3116  1552  2780  1732  3116  1552 3116 1552 
Probit regression, marginal effects reported.  Dependent variable is whether firm exited.   
All regressions have controls for firm characteristics, other investment climate variables and sector and city dummies included. 
Law” uses the Kaufmann-Kraay variable that is centered on 0; those below 0 are categorized as ‘poor’ and those above as ‘strong’. 
“Inefficient Bankruptcy processes” are countries below the median time to go through the official proceedings according to Doing Business.   